Welcome to my *bilingual* Blog
Willkommen auf meinem *zweisprachigen* Blog

It’s been 7 years already since I have moved to Jerusalem, the capital of Israel. By now I cannot imagine at all returning to Berlin or any other place on earth. I have become a proud [21.century] Zionist – in other words, I am more than happy that I have discovered my homeland and eventually settled down on it. Israel – a country, whose water and weather, sand and stones I have learned to love over the time.
Seit über 7 Jahren lebe ich nun in Jerusalem, der Hauptstadt Israels. Mittlerweile kann ich mir nicht vorstellen zurück nach Berlin, noch sonst wohin zu ziehen. Ich bin ein stolzer ]21. Jahrhundert[ Zionist geworden – soll heißen, bin glücklich, dass ich meine Heimat Israel entdeckt und besiedelt habe. Israel - ein Land, dessen Wasser und Wetter, Sand und Steine ich langsam aber sehr sicher zu lieben gelernt habe.

Unfortunately some people see things quite differently and instead of admiring the stones of Jerusalem and the sand of Tel Aviv, they hate it. In many places in the world people are thus at one regarding anything concerning “the Zionist state”. Some proclaim publicly that Israel is a “germ which should be squeezed out”; others claim that Israel is the “last remaining colonial power”; again others hold the opinion that Israel is a country of aggressive soldiers and Holocaust survivors who even succeed to suppress their minorities living in between them.
Jerusalemer Stein und Tel Aviver Sand stoßen jedoch nicht nur auf bewundernde Augen, sondern zunehmend auch auf Hass. In sehr vielen Ecken der Welt ist man sich ziemlich einig, wenn es um den „zionistischen Staat“ geht. Die einen verkünden öffentlich, dass Israel eine „Bakterie ist, die man schnellstmöglich ausdrücken sollte“; andere behaupten, dass Israel die „letzte verbliebene Kolonialmacht“ ist; wiederum andere sind der Auffassung, dass in Israel ausschließlich aggressive Soldaten und Holocaust-Überlebende wohnen, die es auch noch schaffen ihre Minderheiten zu unterdrücken.

Certainly all this is anti-Semitism/anti-Zionism/anti-Israelism, call it what you want, propaganda, which in absolutely no way reflect the reality of this beautiful and very special country. The reality here is much more complicated and probably therefore much more exciting, which is perceivable all over the world, in every language, since this “small spot of land” is been focused on almost all year long.
Das alles ist natürlich anti-semitische/anti-zionistische/anti-israelische, wie auch immer man „es“ gerade nennen möchte, Propaganda, die in keinster Weise die Realität dieses wunderschönen und sehr besonderen Landes widerspiegeln. Die Realität hier ist um einiges komplizierter, deshalb auch spannender, was sich bemerkbar macht, wenn man egal wo, egal auf welcher Sprache Nachrichten hört, denn fast das ganze Jahr über wird aus diesem „Quadratkilometer“ berichtet.

I am neither a journalist nor the chairperson of any academic institute; nevertheless, maybe even therefore, I hope that my opinions will make you think about the issues I will relate to.
I will especially deal with current Jerusalem and Israel relating matters, but among other themes will also refer to the Middle East, Iran and international relations in general.
Ich bin weder Journalist noch Vorsitzender irgendeines akademischen Institutes, jedoch, bzw. gerade deshalb, hoffe ich, dass meine Meinungen für manch einen von euch interessant sind und zum nachdenken verleiten.
Unter anderem werde ich Themen ansprechen, die das heutige Jerusalem und Israel direkt betreffen, werde aber auch über den Mittleren Osten, Iran und Internationale Beziehungen generell schreiben.



30.06.2009

Iran - struggle within the regime!

out of http://www.stratfor.com/
.
.
The key to understanding the situation in Iran is realizing that the past weeks have seen not an uprising against the regime, but a struggle within the regime. Ahmadinejad is not part of the establishment, but rather has been struggling against it, accusing it of having betrayed the principles of the Islamic Revolution. The post-election unrest in Iran therefore was not a matter of a repressive regime suppressing liberals (as in Prague in 1989), but a struggle between two Islamist factions that are each committed to the regime, but opposed to each other.
.
.
First, there was no democratic uprising of any significance in Iran. Second, there is a major political crisis within the Iranian political elite, the outcome of which probably tilts toward Ahmadinejad but remains uncertain. Third, there will be no change in the substance of Iran’s foreign policy, regardless of the outcome of this fight. The fantasy of a democratic revolution overthrowing the Islamic Republic — and thus solving everyone’s foreign policy problems a la the 1991 Soviet collapse — has passed.
.
.
When the West looks at Iran, two concerns are expressed. The first relates to the Iranian nuclear program, and the second relates to Iran’s support for terrorists, particularly Hezbollah. Neither Iranian faction is liable to abandon either, because both make geopolitical sense for Iran and give it regional leverage. Tehran’s primary concern is regime survival, and this has two elements. The first is deterring an attack on Iran, while the second is extending Iran’s reach so that such an attack could be countered.

Keine Kommentare: